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Constitutional Law-Commerce Clause: Local Discrimination
in Environmental Protection Regulation
Since the United States Supreme Court determined in Cooley v.
Board of Wardens" that the Constitution's grant to Congress of the
power to regulate commerce 2 did not necessarily exclude states from
exercising the same power,3 state regulation of commerce has been
subject to frequent and varying4  court scrutiny. In Hackensack
Meadowlands Development Commission v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill
Authority5 the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a New Jersey
statute banning in-state disposal of out-of-state solid waste6 did not
unconstitutionally infringe upon the congressional power to regulate
commerce. It is doubtful, however, that federal courts would agree
with this conclusion; and it is possible that this statute, although promul-
gated pursuant to the traditional police power vested in the states, is
unconstitutional despite the federal courts' willingness to uphold state
police power enactments undertaken in the field of environmental
protection. 7
1. 53 U.s. (12 How.) 298 (1851).
2. The commerce clause provides: "The Congress shall have Power. . . To reg-
ulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes .... ." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. 53 U.S. at 318-20. Drawing an analogy between the power of taxation and
the power to regulate commerce, the Court observed that the existence of each respective
power in the Congress could be compatible with the existence of a similar power in the
states and that the states could legislate in the commerce area unless such action con-
flicted with congressional legislation or with a necessary uniformity in the regulation of
any one subject matter within the field of commerce. Id.
4. The apparent inconsistency in Supreme Court adjudication of cases arising
under the commerce clause can be ascribed to two factors: (1) the difficulty in deter-
mining the exact meaning and scope of a congressional act in the commerce field, as
discussed by the Court in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), and (2) the
different tests that the Court has applied at any one time to state regulations challenged
on commerce clause grounds. See text accompanying notes 24 & 28 infra.
5. 68 N.J. 451, 348 A.2d 505 (1975), prob. juris. noted sub nom. City of Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey, 96 S. Ct. 1504 (1976).
6. See note 8 infra.
7. The New Jersey Supreme Court cited several recent decisions in both federal
arid state forums that sustained environmental protection statutes against commerce
clause attack. 68 N.J. at 476, 348 A.2d at 518. See note 40 infra.
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New Jersey originally forbade disposal of out-of-state waste within
the Hackensack Meadowlands District and later extended the ban to
cover the entire state.8 The state agencies implementing the ban, the
Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission (HMDC) and the
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), brought suit to enjoin
the Municipal Sanitary Landfill Authority (MSLA) from accepting for
disposal in its landfill site within the Hackensack Meadowlands District
any solid wastes originating or collected outside of New Jersey.0
Defendants' ° challenged the constitutionality of the agencies' regula-
tions and the authorizing statute on the grounds that the Waste Control
Act and several of the -MDC regulations were arbitrary and unreason-
able and that they violated both the commerce clause and the privileges
and immunities clause; defendants further contended that the proce-
8. The Hackensack Meadowlands Reclamation and Development Act called for
the orderly development of the Meadowlands and special provisions for solid waste dis-
posal there. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:17-1 to -86 (West Supp. 1976). At the time
the state sought development of the area, not merely its preservation, for the objective
was "to reclaim, plan, develop and redevelop the Hackensack meadowlands." Id. §
13:17-1. The Legislature thereafter passed a Solid Waste Management Act designed to
achieve safe and effective disposal of solid waste throughout New Jersey. N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 13:lE-1 to -37 (West Supp. 1976). Ultimately, the Legislature, after find-
ing that solid waste posed a grave threat to the quality of the state's environment, en-
acted the Waste Control Act, which in its final form empowered the commissioner of
the State Department of Environmental Protection to regulate or ban disposal within
New Jersey of out-of-state solid waste. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:11-1 to -10 (West
Supp. 1976). The section of the statute establishing the ban provides:
The Legislature finds and determines that . . . the volume of solid and
liquid waste continues to rapidly increase, that the treatment and disposal of
these wastes continues to pose an even greater threat to the quality of the en-
vironment of New Jersey, that the available and appropriate land fill sites
within the State are being diminished, that the environment continues to be
threatened by the treatment and disposal of waste which originated or was col-
lected outside the State and that the public health, safety and welfare require
that the treatment and disposal within this State of all wastes generated outside
of the State be prohibited.
No person shall bring into this State any solid or liquid waste which orig-
inated or was collected outside the territorial limits of the State . . . until
the commissioner [of Environmental Protection] shall determine that such
action can be permitted without endangering the public health, safety and wel-
fare and has promulgated regulations permitting and regulating the treatment
and disposal of such waste in this State. Any person violating this provision
shall be subject to the penalty and enforcement provisions of the "Waste Con-
trol Act."
Id. §§ 13:11-9, -10. Both the Department of Environmental Protection and the
Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission promulgated regulations towards
this end. NJ. ADMIN. CODE 7:1-4.2 (1974); N.J. ADMiN. CODE, 19:7-1.1 (1973).
9. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth.,
127 N.J. Super. 160, 316 A.2d 711 (Ch. 1974).
10. The MSLA is a joint venture wholly owned and operated by other named de-
fendants. The City of Yonkers, New York, whose refuse was being deposited on the
MSLA site within the Hackensack Meadowlands District, moved for and was granted
leave to intervene as a party defendant. Id. at 163, 316 A.2d at 712.
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dures adopted by the DEP in promulgating its rule violated due
process."'
Upholding only defendants' commerce clause claims, 2 the Super-
ior Court of New Jersey found that "[a]lthough the State's objective
in attempting to conserve a local natural resource for local needs is a
proper police power purpose, that [objective] cannot be accomplished
by discrimination based on the source of the refuse."' 3  Accordingly,
the exclusion of out-of-state solid waste from deposit within the
Hackensack Meadowlands District was declared unconstitutional.' 4
Subsequently the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification in
Hackensack5 and contemporaneously brought forward for argument
and disposition' 6 a suit by the City of Philadelphia against New Jersey
in which New Jersey's state-wide ban on out-of-state solid waste was
declared unconstitutional as effecting an improper discrimination against
interstate commerce.
11. Id. at 163, 316 A.2d at 712. The privileges and immunities clause provides:
"The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens
in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
12. The court found that the promulgation of the regulations was not arbitrary, nor
did it contravene the enabling act under which the regulations were developed, the Hack-
ensack Meadowlands Reclamation and Development Act. See note 8 supra. The failure
to hold a hearing prior to adoption of the DEP rule was found not to have denied de-
fendants due process, inasmuch as no hearing was required by statute or constitution.
The court also determined that defendants did not vigorously advance their argument
with respect to the privileges and immunities clause and that, regardless of this, there
were serious infirmities in that position. 127 N.J. Super. at 167-69, 316 A.2d at 713-15.
13. Id. at 174, 316 A.2d at 718.
14. While discussing the validity of the state's action as an exercise of the police
power, the court observed that the regulations then under attack did not prohibit disposal
of out-of-state solid waste throughout New Jersey, but only banned its disposal within
the Hackensack Meadowlands District. Questioning whether such a limited ban could
be considered a measure undertaken to protect the public health of the state, the court
added, in a footnote, that newly enacted sections 9 and 10 of the Solid Waste Act
(quoted in note 8 supra) and the new DEP regulation promulgated thereunder might
render its decision moot by establishing a state-wide ban against the importation of at
least some forms of solid waste. Id. at 170 n.1, 316 A.2d at 716 n.1. The widening
of the application of the ban, however, did not affect the grounds upon which the deci-
sion of the superior court rested, since the regulations were delcared unconstitutional not
as an improper or unnecessary exertion of the police power but for discriminating
against New Jersey's sister states. Accordingly, the New Jersey Supreme Court, while
noting the change the DEP regulation underwent, did not otherwise deal with the issue
of the scope of the ban in its discussion of the statute's validity as an exercise under
the police power. 68 N.J. at 457 n.2, 348 A.2d at 508 n.2.
15. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth.,
66 N.J. 337, 331 A.2d 37 (1974). During this time the judgment of the superior court
had been stayed.
16. City of Philadelphia v. State, 67 N.J. 102, 335 A.2d 55 (1974).
17. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth.,
68 N.J. 451, 459, 348 A.2d 505, 509 (1975), prob. jurls, noted sub nom. City of Phila-
delphia v. New Jersey, 96 S. Ct. 1504 (1976).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court in Hackensack determined that
the disputed solid waste did in fact constitute articles of commerce
within the meaning of the commerce clause,' and found that the stat-
ute was a valid exercise of the state's police power' 9 in an area that
Congress had not preempted.20 In disagreement with the lower courts,
the supreme court ruled that the New Jersey Waste Act did not dis-
criminate unconstitutionally against sister states.2' Declaring that the
statute would be valid if the burden it imposed on interstate commerce
did not outweigh its benefit to the state, the court found that the stat-
ute imposed only a "slight" burden on commerce22 and held that the
statute's aim was "crucial to the welfare" of the state.23 As a result
of this balancing the court reversed the judgments of the lower courts
and sustained the state's actions.
Whether this particular exercise of the police power to achieve
environmental protection would successfully withstand a challenge in
the federal courts depends upon the "balancing test" applicable in a
commerce clause review.24  As the New Jersey court observed, the
18. Id. at 468-69, 348 A.2d at 514. The lower court in Hackensack had not explic-
itly stated that solid waste constituted an article of commerce within the commerce
clause. See 127 N.J. Super. at 169-70, 316 A.2d at 716. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey, however, relying on United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass'n, 242
F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd, 357 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384
U.S. 961 (1966), determined that the disposal of the solid waste, regardless of the con-
jectural value of the waste itself, constituted interstate commerce. 68 N.J. at 468-69,
348 A.2d at 514. The holding in Pennsylvania Refuse was particularly pertinent to the
Hackensack situation since in the former case it was determined that "refuse transported
from Pennsylvania to New Jersey and disposed of in the latter state . . . was plainly
a proper subject of interstate commerce." 357 F.2d at 808.
19. 68 NJ. at 472, 348 A.2d at 516.
20. Id. at 471, 348 A.2d at 515.
21. Id. at 477, 348 A.2d at 518.
22. Id. at 475, 348 A.2d at 517-18.
23. Id. at 478, 348 A.2d at 519.
24. The balancing test juxtaposes the burden(s) on interstate commerce flowing
from the challenged provision with the benefit(s) to the state derived therefrom. The
most recent enunciation of the balancing test by the United States Supreme Court is to
be found in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), in which the Court stated:
Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes affect-
ing interstate commerce have been variously stated, the general rule that
emerges can be phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates evenhandedly
to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate com-
merce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. . . . If
a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree.
And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on
the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted
as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Id. at 142. Opposed to this somewhat hesitant espousal of the balancing test is another
Court decision, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, R.I. &
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commerce clause test applied to state actions has not been uniform. 5
This disparity is in part a result of Cooley,2" the first United States
Supreme Court decision to apply a commerce clause test, in which the
Court restricted its holding to the facts and declined to articulate a gen-
eral doctrine for future guidance." Uncertainty is evident in many com-
merce clause cases,28 particularly in those like Hackensack that deal
with state environmental protection statutes.2 9  Yet despite divergence
in approach by federal and state courts on the issue of environmental
regulation the cases uniformly hold that no state action can survive a
commerce clause analysis if its effect on interstate commerce is heavily
burdensome or if it discriminates against interstate commerce.30
It is clear that the New Jersey court was correct in its decision that
the area of solid waste disposal was not preempted by Congress,3' and
P.R.R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968). Upholding the validity of an Arkansas "full-crew" law
that required a minimum train crew under certain conditions of railroad operations in
the state, the Court strongly implied that such a test, if utilized at all, was to be applied
only by another governmental body: "The question of safety in the circumstances of
this case is essentially a matter of public policy, and public policy can, under our consti-
tutional system, be fixed only by the people acting through their elected representatives."
Id. at 138. The Court then noted its doubt as to whether in such a case any balancing
test at all could be appropriate: "It is difficult at best to say that financial losses should
be balanced against the loss of lives and limbs of workers and people using the high-
ways." Id. at 140.
25. 68 N.J. at 473, 348 A.2d at 516.
26. See text accompanying notes 1-3 and note 3 supra.
27. See 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 320.
28. See Aldens, Inc. v. Packel, 524 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1975). In that case a fed-
eral appeals judge, after noting that "[c]lassifying the Supreme Court's commerce clause
adjudications for the purpose of analytical application may seem to many an exercise
in futility," attempted to devise his own categories in order to determine whether the
statute there under challenge transgressed the federal plenary power under the commerce
clause. Id. at 45.
29. The balancing test as applied in Pike and prior decisions is severely criticized
in Note, Use of the Commerce Clause to Invalidate Anti-Phosphate Legislation: Will
It Wash?, 45 U. CoLo. L. REv. 487 (1974). This Note cites Professor David Engdahl
as a recent commentator on the history of the commerce clause who urges abandonment
of the balancing test in cases arising under the clause. The Note refers to Engdahl as
taking "the position that if the . . . balancing test is reached, a court should make a
presumption in favor of the validity of the legislation." Id. at 493. The failure, how-
ever, to apply such a test by two Oregon state courts reviewing the constitutionality of
the Oregon Minimum Deposit Act, see text accompanying note 41 infra, was criticized
in Note, State Environmental Protection Legislation and the Commerce Clause, 87
HARV. L. REv. 1762 (1974). Tracing the history of the balancing test to its current
form in Pike, the Note concludes: "Thus, it appears to be the duty of the courts to bal-
ance the harms and benefits of the state's environmental legislation." Id. at 1778.
30. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970), discussed in note 24
supra.
31. The preemption test as applied in the field of interstate commerce was set forth
by the United States Supreme Court in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc, v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132 (1963):
The principle to be derived from our decisions is that federal regulation
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in its finding that the New Jersey provisions were a valid exercise of
the state's police power, especially in light of the extensive scope of
that power as recognized by the Supreme Court.12  Nonetheless, the
Hackensack court erred in upholding the validity of the state's solid
waste ban; a comparison of Hackensack with cases in the environmental
protection field reveals that the Waste Control Act, contrary to the New
Jersey court's conclusions, discriminates against interstate commerce and
significantly burdens the flow of that commerce without providing com-
parable benefit to the state. The commerce clause standards that
environmental regulations must satisfy were articulated in Huron Port-
land Cement Co. v. City of Detroit,38 the leading decision of the United
States Supreme Court in which an environmental protection provision
was juxtaposed with the federal interest of ensuring unimpeded inter-
state commerce. In upholding Detroit's Smoke Abatement Code as a
valid exercise of the traditional police power34 the Court in Huron set
forth the controlling principle in cases of this nature: "Even-handed
local regulation to effectuate a legitimate local public interest is valid
unless pre-empted by federal action . . . or unduly burdensome on
... interstate commerce. 5 Under this broad statement of principle
the New Jersey Waste Act might well be found, in a more neutral forum,
to constitute an impermissible burden on interstate commerce.
Although the Detroit code in Huron resulted in a noticeable
impact on at least some elements of interstate commerce, 6 it imposed
its requirements in a manner that was "even-handed"; that is, the regu-
lations were "applicable alike to 'any person, firm or corporation' within
the city," as well as to those without." By contrast the New Jersey
of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory
power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of regulated
subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistak-
ably so ordained.
Id. at 142. The most recent congressional statement in this particular area, the Solid
Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251-3259 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) declares that, de-
spite the nationwide gravity of the solid waste problem, "the collection and disposal of
solid wastes should continue to be primarily the function of State, regional, and local
agencies . . . ." Id. § 3251(a)(6). This recognition of the primacy of the states in
the field of solid waste disposal defeats any presumption of federal preemption. For
a further discussion of this issue, see Note, 87 HARv. L. REv., supra note 29, at 1770-72
(1974).
32. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954).
33. 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
34. Id. at 442.
35. Id. at 443.
36.. "Structural alterations [to the ships of appellant] would be required in order
to insure compliance with the Code." Id. at 441.
37. Id. at 448.
[Vol. 55466
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provisions are aimed solely at out-of-state waste. The New Jersey
court declared there had been no discrimination, at least in an economic
sense, because out-of-state refuse collectors could continue to collect
and dispose of solid waste within the state if the refuse originated within
New Jersey.38 This observation does not adequately dispose of the dis-
crimination issue, however, especially since the court found that solid
waste did constitute an article of commerce within the commerce
clause.39  To restrict the service of waste disposal to only those gener-
ating solid waste within New Jersey clearly discriminates against non-
New Jersey interests since the service of refuse disposal constitutes
commerce not only for the disposal agents but also for those whose solid
waste is removed. Therefore it is clear that the New Jersey Waste
Act's discriminatory impact distinguishes this statute from provisions
upheld in Huron as well as provisions upheld in other cases utilized by
the New Jersey court as supportive authority, thereby rendering the
New Jersey laws voidable under the commerce clause standards applied
by the Supreme Court in Huron.4"
38. 68 N.J. at 475, 348 A.2d at 517.
39. See text accompanyfng note 18 supra.
40. According to the Huron standards, only that "[s]tate regulation, based on the
police power, which does not discriminate against interstate commerce or operate to dis-
rupt its required uniformity, may constitutionally stand." 362 U.S. at 448 (emphasis
added). In Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148 (1976), the Huron principle controlled the outcome
with respect to the commerce clause attack maintained by appellant. Id. at 909. An-
other case cited by the Hackensack court as supportive of its decision, Portland Pipe
Line Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Comm'n, 307 A.2d 1 (Me.), appeal dis-
missed, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973), upheld a Maine provision against a commerce clause
challenge because the court found that its impact, if any, on interstate commerce was
non-discriminatory and even-handed, as required by Huron. Id. at 40. In that case the
validity of a tax on the transfer of oil over water in Maine was sustained because it
was levied on oil transferred intrastate as well as on oil traveling through interstate and
foreign channels. In contrast the New Jersey Act not only discriminates against inter-
state commerce but bans rather than merely regulates the importation of material from
other states into New Jersey, in essence prohibiting the flow of that element of interstate
commerce. As to this issue see text accompanying notes 52-66 infra. Procter & Gamble
Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975), is
also clearly distinguishable from Hackensack. In Procter & Gamble a modified balanc-
ing test was applied to demonstrate that a Chicago ordinance banning the sale of any
detergent containing phosphates did not unconstitutionally burden the flow of interstate
commerce and could therefore be readily upheld as a reasonable means of achieving a
legitimate legislative aim. The Chicago ordinance differed from the New Jersey Waste
Act since, designed to prevent the growth of nuisance algae in the Illinois Waterway,
the ordinance applied a non-discriminatory ban against the entry into the city (and thus
into the city's portion of the Waterway) of any phosphate detergent. To be fully anal-
ogous to the Chicago ordinance the New Jersey statute would have to ban the disposal
of all solid waste in the imperiled areas. Since there were "no discriminatory aspects
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If subjected to the exhaustive commerce clause analysis set forth
in American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Commission41 the New
Jersey act would be unconstitutional under criteria other than a test of
discriminatory intent. In American Can the Oregon court determined
that the increased costs arising from the state provision under attack
were borne by all affected industries without regard to state lines.42 In
obvious contrast to the Oregon approach, the New Jersey Supreme
Court ignored the extent of consequential economic discrimination
against non-New Jersey groups who benefit from the transfer of waste
to New Jersey.4" Although economic discrimination is a relatively
remote effect of the New Jersey statute, it could result in invalidation
of the New Jersey Waste Control Act were a court to explore in detail
the economic burdens and benefits flowing from the act and apply to
its economic findings the balancing test required in a full commerce
clause review.
The Hackensack decision is also vulnerable to close review
because it fails properly to refute objections that the act intentionally
discriminates against other states-objections that are based primarily
on what may be termed the "natural resources cases ' 44 cited by the
lower court in Hackensack. At issue in those cases was the validity
of provisions regulating natural gas or petroleum that had the effect of
retaining the resource within the producing states. The regulations were
associated with this purpose [the elimination of nuisance algae] that might invalidate it,"
the Procter & Gamble court found that the purpose and the Chicago ordinance promot-
ing it were not unconstitutional. 509 F.2d at 80. Confronted with the discriminatory
aspects of the New Jersey act-which protects only New Jersey's interests, by banning
only non-New Jersey solid waste-it is questionable whether the Procter & Gamble
court would arrive at the same conclusion.
41. 15 Or. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973). This decision upheld the constitution-
ality of the Oregon Minimum Deposit Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 45.810-.890 (1975), which
requires that all beverage containers sold in Oregon be accepted for reuse by distributors
and bottlers, and which enacted a ban on pull-top cans.
42. 15 Or. App. at 642, 517 P.2d at 703. See Note, 87 HARV. L. REV., supra note
29, at 1783, which further analyzes the economic burdens borne by the State of Oregon,
its citizens, and the various facets of the industry as a result of the act and concludes,
inter alia, that the deposit imposes no real handicap on the industry and that the larger
portion of the economic burden is internalized and thus bome ultimately by the consum-
ers of the beverages under regulation.
43. The New Jersey statute would lead to an immediate increase in solid waste dis-
posal costs for the litigant cities in Hackensack. 68 N.J. at 476, 348 A.2d at 518. It
is obvious that such a burden, however "small" or "modest" the Hackensack court char-
acterized it, would not be borne by any New Jersey interests associated with either the
generation or disposal of solid wate in the state.
44. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural
Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911). See text accompanying note 13 supra.
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invariably defended, as in West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,45 as "exer-
cise[s] of the police power to conserve the natural resources of the
state,"'46 but the Supreme Court in West ruled such resource conserva-
tion was really designed only to serve "the business welfare" of the pro-
ducing state, and if adopted by each state would unconstitutionally
"halt . . commerce at state lines."47 The New Jersey Supreme Court
found this reasoning inapplicable to the New Jersey Waste Act because
of the distinction it discovered between the basic state purposes of the
West regulations on the one hand and those of the New Jersey act on
the other: the distinction between an effort "to preserve and exploit
a [natural] resource for selfish economic and commercial gain" and
an attempt "to protect the health of its citizens and give some measure
of precarious protection to its natural environment.1
4 8
There nevertheless exists a greater degree of similarity between
the two types of state action than the New Jersey court chose to recog-
nize. The original and primary goal of the New Jersey provisions was
development, not mere conservation, of the disposal areas.49  Ad-
mittedly the promotion of the wise and productive development of land
is a legitimate aim of the police power, but however important and
worthwhile the commercial and industrial development of the Hacken-
sack Meadowlands and other landfill sites may be to New Jersey, the
promotion of this activity does not constitute health or environmental
preservation and cannot successfully be defended as a measure under-
taken to achieve either goal.50 Rather it might be appropriate at this
juncture for courts to recognize that in an area as heavily populated as
the Northeast Corridor landfill sites and open land of any sort are as
valuable a natural resource and economic commodity as gas or oil con-
tinue to be. Discriminatory measures designed to prevent utilization of
this resource by other states, typified by the New Jersey Waste Act, may
therefore be subject to the limiting doctrine set forth in West.51
45. 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
46. Id. at 249.
47. Id. at 255.
48. 68 N.J. at 477, 348 A.2d at 518.
49. See note 8 supra.
50. As the New Jersey Supreme Court observed in Hackensack, "garbage and
refuse do provide a great threat to the public health." 68 NJ. at 472, 348 A.2d at 516
(citing Shaw v. Township of Byram, 86 NJ. Super. 598, 602, 207 A.2d 570, 572, cert.
denied, 45 NJ. 35, 210 A.2d 780 (1965)). The Shaw decision, however, concerned the
open dumping of garbage, which presumably involved a far greater degree of risk to the
public health than does sanitary landfill (which is by definition a less hazardous opera-
tion), the mode of solid waste disposal adopted in the Hackensack Meadowlands Dis-
trict and other areas in the state.
51. A more recent Supreme Court decision has held that state fixing of natural gas
1977] 469
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Finally, the fact that New Jersey chose the extreme recourse of
a ban to achieve its purpose subjects the Waste Control Act to a high
degree of judicial scrutiny and, accordingly, a high risk of invalidation. "
Not all outright bans of a given material in commerce are unconstitu-
tional;53 however, such prohibitions are inevitably reviewed with great
assiduity to ensure that they do not "interfere with transportation into
or through the State, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-
protection.. . . The Police power of a State cannot obstruct foreign
commerce or interstate commerce beyond the necessity for its exercise
... ."1 The constitutionality of a total ban must be conditioned on its
wellhead prices is permissible within the commerce clause as a legitimate effort to con-
serve valuable natural resources. Cities Serv. Co. v. Peerless Oil & Gas Co., 340 U.S.
179 (1950). The measure was upheld because Oklahoma was "justifiably concerned
with preventing rapid and uneconomic dissipation of one of its chief natural resources."
Id. at 187. The Court noted, however, that there were limits to the ways in which a
state might respond to such a concern, limits that might be of some pertinence to Hack-
ensack. "The only requirements consistently recognized have been that the regulation
not discriminate or place an embargo on interstate commerce, that it safeguard an ob-
vious state interest, and that the local interest at stake outweigh whatever national inter-
est there might be in the prevention of state restrictions." Id. at 186-87 (emphasis
added). Such limitations apparently led to the invalidation of a Texas statute that for-
bade the exportation of well water to other states without specific legislative approval.
City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 35
(1966). In that case the court noted critically that contrary to the avowed purpose of
the statute it did not "operate to conserve water resources of the State of Texas except
in the sense that it [did] so for her own benefit to the detriment of her sister States
as in the case of West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co." Id. at 839-40. The Texas statute,
like the New Jersey act, prohibited only out-of-state interests from utilizing the protected
natural resource (well water and landfill sites, respectively) while "indulging in the sub-
stantial discrimination" of allowing the prohibited activity to be carried on by those
within the state. Id. at 840. In placing a discriminatory embargo on interstate trans-
portation of the unique natural and environmental resource of water the Texas statute
was thus clearly unconstitutional under West; it is likely that the New Jersey Waste Con-
trol Act, by enacting a ban on out-of-state use of a like resource, is similarly invalid.
52. See, e.g., Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Comm'n,
307 A.2d 1 (Me.), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1035 (1973). The court upheld the valid-
ity of the Maine provision taxing oil transference because, in part, the statute did not
prohibit that aspect of interstate commerce but instead merely undertook to regulate it so
as to alleviate the effects of the peril of oil spills. Id. at 37.
53. State power to regulate traffic in intoxicating liquor represents one well-recog-
nized exception to the federal plenary powers under the commerce clause. See National
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Miller, 358 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Kan.), afj'd, 414 U.S. 948
(1973). Additional areas in which pervasive state regulation is permitted are discussed
in Note, 87 HARV. L. REv., supra note 29, at 1784. Because of the deference accorded
to the states, discriminatory regulations in the commerce of firearms or firecrackers, for
example, are not likely to be reversed. But see Bowman v. Chicago & N. Ry., 125
U.S. 465 (1888), in which the Court held unconstitutional an Iowa law banning the im-
portation (as opposed to the mere sale) of intoxicating liquor.
54. Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465, 472-74 (1877), quoted in Bowman v. Chi-
cago & N. Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 491-92 (emphasis added).
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being found nondiscriminatory.55 Unless shown to be essential to the
protection of public health the discriminatory aspects of New Jersey's
waste control measures expose the provisions to constitutional attack
as impermissible prohibitions on articles within interstate commerce.
It appears that the New Jersey court's decision in Hackensack
failed to resolve the commerce clause difficulties raised by the statute.
The act apparently does not encroach upon an area preempted by the
federal government,5 7 but it is doubtful that the New Jersey program
provides the type of solution for the solid waste disposal problem that
Congress envisaged. Consequently, the act might be regarded with
disfavor in a federal forum because it fails to coincide with the general
direction of federal policy.58 In addition, were the balancing test to
be applied by a federal court similar to the one applied in American
55. See, e.g., Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946). This case upheld the
constitutionality of California provisions excluding insurance brokers and agents from
doing business within California if they did not satisfy reserve requirements set forth
by the state. The Court declared in the determinative part of its opinion: "Exclusion
there is, but it is exclusion of what the State has the power to keep out, until Congress
speaks otherwise." Id. at 459. It sustained the validity of the reserve requirements,
finding that they "cannot be held, either on the face of the statute or by any showing
that has been made, to be. . . designed or effective either to discriminate against foreign
or interstate insurers or to forbid or exclude their activities. . . ." Id.
56. Compare Hackensack with Palladio, Inc. v. Diamond, 321 F. Supp. 630
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd per curiam, 440 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 983
(1971), which upheld the constitutionality of a New York statute banning the importa-
tion and sale of certain wild animal products in New York. Although the New Jersey
Waste Act is, like the Palladio provision, an exercise of the police power undertaken
in an area not preempted by Congress, the New Jersey statute is not so neutral and even-
handed in its prohibition. The New York ban was not established to protect or in any
way facilitate the state's control of animals native to or otherwise within New York,
nor was New York attempting to provide some shield to producers of such products
within the state. The New York ban did not distinguish among the animals themselves
or the products obtained from them by state or national origin; the New Jersey statute,
on the other hand, makes that distinction and does so in order to facilitate the state's
disposal of its solid waste and to promote other state interests. Although these interests
may be as worthy of protection as those New York sought to promote, the discrimination
between New Jersey and non-New Jersey articles is not duplicated in the New York stat-
ute. Accordingly, subjected to commerce clause scrutiny, the New Jersey ban, thus dis-
tinguishable, may not meet with the same success as the New York statute reviewed in
Palladio.
57. See note 31 and text accompanying note 20 supra.
58. The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare was empowered by the Solid
Waste Disposal Act to "encourage the enactment of improved and, so far as practicable,
uniform State and local laws governing solid-waste disposal." 42 U.S.C. § 3254 (1970).
Although at least one state, Maine, has adopted a statute similar in purpose and effect
to the New Jersey Solid Waste Control Act, ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17, § 2253 (1976), New
Jersey's neighboring states of Pennsylvania, New York and Delaware have not. Thus,
the New Jersey statute, though not intrusive on a federally preempted field, obstructs
the uniformity Congress desires to achieve in that area.
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Can59 the Waste Act and its attendant regulations could be held to have
engendered an impermissible economic impact on the flow of interstate
commerce. In a case such as Hackensack it is possible that the balanc-
ing test can properly be applied only by a federal court, for in the
presence of outright discrimination occurring at the state boundaries the
ability of the state courts to apply the test in a proficient and neutral
manner may be limited.
The Hackensack court described in detail the "crisis proportions"
that the solid waste problem had reached in New Jersey 0 and it is
undeniable that New Jersey does have the right to undertake appropri-
ate measures to deal with this pressing environmental concern. How-
ever, even if the Waste Control Act did not raise troublesome constitu-
tional questions New Jersey would eventually have to adopt alternative
methods of solving the state's waste disposal problem, for it is apparent
that the New Jersey Waste Act only alleviates the situation on a
temporary basis. As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated, the ban
on in-state disposal of solid waste originating outside the state would
lengthen the lifespan of existing New Jersey landfill sites by a mere
eight percent.61  Therefore, although the statute was enacted to pre-
vent "further virgin wetlands or other undeveloped lands from being
devoted to landfill purposes," '62 it seems that the prohibition would at
best only delay for a short time the conversion of such areas into land-
fill sites. The statute's long-term benefit to the state is miniscule-
and compared to the discriminatory burden cast on the flow of inter-
state commerce and the resulting negative repercussions to out-of-state
interests it is doubtful that the statute could survive any thorough appli-
cation of the balancing test in a federal forum.
Hackensack accentuates the need for a federal uniform approach
to the problem, 3 but it is unlikely that Congress will act toward this
59. See text accompanying notes 41-43 supra.
60. 68 N.J. at 460-65, 348 A.2d at 509-12.
61. Id. at 461, 348 A.2d at 510. The court further found that as of January 1,
1974, sanitary landfills within the Hackensack Meadowlands would be usable for only
one year longer than expected if the ban were enacted. Prior to the enactment of the
ban it was estimated that all land presently committed to landfill operations would be
exhausted by 1982; extending the usefulness of those sites by eight percent would not
appreciably lengthen the period during which they could be used for disposal. Id. at
462 n.7, 348 A.2d at 510 n.7. New Jersey's solid waste could be disposed of in its neigh-
boring states, but it is conceivable that, inspired or irked by New Jersey's Waste Act,
those states might pass reciprocal measures, foreclosing New Jersey from employing that
avenue.
62. Id. at 465, 348 A.2d at 512.
63. See Note, Control of Redeemable Solid Waste: A Proposed National Bill, 5
SuFoL L. REv. 962 (1971).
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end.64 However, the New Jersey Solid Waste Act and the Hackensack
decision upholding it may impel the federal courts toward the enuncia-
tion of a new statement on this statute and others that represent a chal-
lenge to the plenary federal commerce powers and toward the invali-
dation of any environmental protection provision that erects a
discriminatory barrier against other states. The only other alternative
may be a beginning of the "ecological Balkanization" of this country
similar to "the intolerable experience of the economic Balkanization of
America that existed in the colonial period and under the Articles of
Confederation" 5-the situation the commerce clause was designed to
eliminate.
IRA STEVEN LEFTON
Constitutional Law-:-Conditions of Confinement for
Administratively Segregated Prisoners
It is common for prisoners subjected to segregation or solitary
confinement to lose many privileges and rights accorded the general
inmate population. The federal courts in recent years have often de-
fined and protected constitutional rights of inmates placed in segrega-
64. A bill to amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 was introduced in the
House of Representatives in 1975 and was designed to oblige each state to adopt a state-
wide waste management and resource recovery program implementing, among other ob-
jectives: "(10) interstate co-operation in waste management and resource recovery, and
(11) consistency of waste management and resource recovery with Federal, state, and
local air and water pollution control, noise control, land use, and other environmental
policies and regulations." H.R. 5487, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I, § 251 (1975). As
hearings on the bill reveal, however, even these proposed amendments would not have
resulted in an increased federal role in the area preempting the states from taking action
on their own. Such state action would still be permitted and therefore could continue
to result in provisions that, like the New Jersey Waste Act, make no effective contribu-
tion to the national effort to deal with the solid waste situation. Thus in response to
a query as to the desirability of areawide, rather than state-by-state approaches, the bill's
sponsor, Rep. Paul G. Rogers, declared, "Well, I think this is commendable, and I think
this should be encouraged. Areawide planning would be encouraged under section
255(b) of my bill, unless the state decides-as Connecticut has-to establish and oper-
ate a statewide plan." Hearings on H.R. 5487 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation
and Commerce of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 101 (1975).
65. American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 618, 628,
517 P.2d 691, 696 (1973).
